1.The new START might brake down for some time the nuclear weapon prolifiration, though, most likely, it would not solve this problem strategically. It is ridiculous to think that Russia and the USA would seriously strive for the nuclear-free world. It is doubtful, in the light of what had been told on TNW, that negotiations on nuclear disarmament would be continued. The further nuclear weapon reductions would be carried out, at the best, by parallel unilateral steps, and probably without mutual coordination at all, i.e. primarily by technical and economic expedience that each of the parties would define independently, without any consultations whatsoever.
2.Upon the ratification of the signed treaty, it would be extremely desirable both politically and diplomatically to draw the American leadership into some broader political and strategic dialogue than TNW reduction. To this effect, it would be possible to propose to start joint search of ways to minimise the risks caused by the reality of existing mutual nuclear deterrence (“an exit beyond deterrence”).
3.In a developing situation - both for a short-term and longer-term perspective (at least, for 20-25 years) - Russia would have no other choice, but to remain a strong nuclear power. Besides, it has to be thought over the expediency of renewal of works on the means to effectively counteract the American PRO, including various ways of both penetrating it, and restrainting its development. These include grazing trajectories, maneuvering warheads, reducing acceleration part of missiles ballistic trajectory, etc.
4.Using the nuclear shield as a cover, it is necessary to actively modernize the Armed Forces adequate to risks, challenges and threats of the 21st century. It is necessary to accelerate building up the scientific and technical reserve in the key directions of development of means of the armed struggle, involving the best intellectual forces. At that, one of the most serious threats to the national security is not just Russia’s technological backlog from the most developed countries, but also the prospect of appearing something technologically unexpected to which it might be not prepared. That is why forecasting (including forsighting) should become one of the major components of the state policy. Another element of such a policy is to become the applied – and successful - usage of the high technologies both in business, and in military sphere.

1. In every world region the crisis developed unevenly, according to unmatched scenarios. In each state it had style of its own, its own characteristics due to differences in inside and outside conditions, in the self-sufficiency level of their economies, due to the degree of their dependence on foreign markets, especially in exporting goods and services, and also due to their chances to attract foreign investments. Under the current crisis, all contradictions of the global capitalist system have become aggravated. On the one hand, the states tried to soothe the raged market element (engaged primarily in speculations with derivatives, currency, energy carriers, food and raw materials), exercising all their power not just to use budget funds and to carry out money emission, but also to redistribute the national income to control the validity of financial operations.
2. One cannot help noting the enhanced tension in the relations between the ‘gold billion’ states and the ‘periphery’ of the global capitalism, that became too obvious at the Copenhagen world conference on climate, when the quotas for emission of hotbed gases into atmosphere have been discussed. The disproportion between the developed and poor countries continues to accrue. According to the World Bank experts, the inflow of the private capital into the ‘periphery’ countries would decrease in 2010: no more than $517 billion against $1.2 trillion in 2007.
3. Having decided to rescue the euro and Greece, the allies told its government to do something to cut the national debt and budget deficit. The European Commission took step unprecedented in the EU history – it put Greece’s state budget under Commission’s control. The EU President, Hermann Van Rompej, was authorized to prepare the draft plan on strengthening of economic supervision over the EU member-states, and also on making mechanisms to prevent similar crises in the future, by the end of this year. For the first time in history, the Greek crisis made it a practical problem the expulsion of this or that country from the zone of euro. Angela Merkel stated, that EU has to worked out the mechanism for such a procedure. Perhaps, the patience of the Germans has run out, for the Chancellor claimed her country could not be the everlasting donor.
4. Still, the economic sky is covered with dark clouds of crisis hurricane. It will take several years to remedy all the wounds inflicted by the market element. And yet, in its depths new ’bubbles’ are being already inflated and old contradictions ripen. Recurrence, as well as spontaneity, are intrinsic in the nature of capitalist market economy and there can be no regulator to provide for its continuous rising. So, it is not far bihind the hills, a new, the seventeenth by the number, global crisis that would lean all its heavy weight on us sometime in 2019-20 and, perhaps, earlier.

1. In Central Asia, Russia needs to retain the levers of influence in developing the transit infrastructure, to provide access to development of the mineral and raw material base to strengthen the resource base of its own and to get scarce minerals. The Russian economy needs access to the superfluous labor force that has no alternative with aggravating demographic problem in our country. It is to our interests to maintain stability and predictability of cooperation in the spheres of Russia’s strategic interests (defense, nuclear, aviation, space-rocket industries), and to use the Central Asia as a buffer zone safeguarding from penetration of undesirable persons or goods to us.
2. The key Russian policy line is to be purposeful influence to form public sentiments and the future elites. Image-making activities in the Central Asia has to be improved drastically, as well as the inter-activities in education and science with the region countries. Thereupon, the labor migrants are to be viewed not just as the source of labor force Russia needs, it should be also kept in mind that it is through Russia’s attitude towards laborers that their ethnic native country’s attitude towards Russia is formed.
3. Russia’s attractiveness as a leader within the Eurasian space might be possible just based upon the growth of the Russian economic and scientific and technological potential, enhanced national competitiveness based on the development of production sector and proactive innovation. Russia needs to overcome its dependence on exporting fuel and raw materials and to more fully satisfy its partners’ demand in new technologies and modern high-tech equipment.
4. The Russian initiatives on big tripartite (Russia, EU, CA countries) projects in the economies of the Central Asian states might become one of the tools in struggle for influence. These may relate to the spheres of common interest – power engineering, transportation, common infrastructure, environment preservation and protection in frontier regions, etc. Implementing tripartite projects would soften the rigid competition with the EU and other outside players. For that purpose, Russia’s initiatives are to be aimed at long-run mutually advantageous cooperation. It seems to be a more effective way to restraint our European partners’ superfluous activity in the zone of Russia’s vital interests.

1. In Russia, Indochina is imagined, to the great degree, as something exotic, some world outlaying provinces. But tectonic geopolitical shifts in Eurasia once again put the region, along with China and India, to the world history foreground scene. In the past half a century, Indochina, as the South East Asia as a whole, became the arena of fierce struggle for influence between the USA, the USSR and China. The American geopolitical technologies of anaconda’s ‘democratic noose’ were in use against Eurasia since the second half of the twentieth century. Their first defeat took place in Indochina. According to the American geopolitical dominoes doctrine, if the South Vietnam fell under Communist control, Communists would run all neighboring states in the South East Asia.
2. The tectonic geopolitical shifts in Eurasia once again put forward to the world history foreground scene, along with the Celestial Empire and India, - Indochina. In this, the essential role is played by the moral courage based on Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Communist ideology. China, after 500-year-interval, has become the world trading power. The geopolitical transformation is bringing in Eurasia a new geopolitical 500-year-cycle, the Southern Seas Great Hour has stricken foreshadowed by the East Asian Dragons. This is what is to define Indochina’s geopolitical code. China together with the Asian Dragons are challenging the West not just in the seas, but also in the sky and cyber spaces.
3. The United States have drained out its abilities to exploit and inculcate the ‘democratic values’ by means of “the most fair bombs and rockets” in Eurasia. The US battle for Indochina is lost. The geopolitical confrontation of the great powers in Indochina has carried away 5 million lives, taking into account the Vietnam war and the genocide in Cambodia. The USA failed to turn Indochina, and Thailand first of all, into its bridgehead to destabilize the Peoples Republic of China. Many an analyst thinks, that it is primarily the United States that profits from globalization. But the Eurasian peoples, thanks to the very globalization, much quicker learn the true essence of America’s ‘struggle’ for democracy that is some fig leaf cover of the US true mercenary ends in the interests of its home monopolies.
4. The events in Eurasia, including Indochina, the coming Southern Seas Great Hour make Russia’s hopes to revive the Great Silk overoptimistic. The precious time, taken by its revival, is lost in infinite imitation of progressive development. After the Soviet Union collapsed, and the world Socialist system was betrayed, and the Cam Ranh military base was dismantled, Russia has lost its geopolitical influence in Indochina for ever, it failed to convert it into sizable economic presence in the region.

1.Till the 2000s, the Uigur and Tibetan projects seemed to be developing absolutely independently. But there still was one common semantic dominant to unite them - the West’s stake on forming the politically contentious deterritorized communities consolidated ethnically and religiously. In the case of the Tibetan ethnocommunity, the West’s twenty-year-long efforts were not wasted. March 2008 disorders in the TAR followed by the steady response of the international public, proved not just the transnational network of the Tibetan Buddhism successful functioning, but also its potential in solving geopolitical tasks.
2.For quite a long time, developing the Uigur project by the principle of transnational ethnoreligious consolidation ran across some insuperable barriers: there were no chance to nominate a single religious leader for all Uigur enclaves, it was impossible to form a government in exile, it was impossible to get ideological solidarity between the Uigur and Western NGOs in their struggle for independent Eastern Turkestan. Just by the late 1990s, the Western sponsors became avident that the Uigur project as an ethnoreligious entity was doomed. The democratic West, in its plan to geopolitically use ‘the Uigur problem’, found itself the hostage of its own geopolitical successes - collapse of the USSR and fighting global terrorism.
3.The analysis of current publications on the Uigur diaspora activities allows to ascertain, that the new format of the Uigur project is to, first of all, reform the Uigur movement into some analogy of the existing Tibetan Buddhism network. It is a matter of urgent completion of three components – the diaspora, government in exile and various NGO for political self-determination. As the Tibetan movement experience has shown, just the coordinated activities of these three components could make the ethno-project some sort of toolkit for geopolitical manipulation.
4.If the political conflictness of the Tibetan Buddhism transnational network is fraught for the Russian Federation with serious internal political problems and tension in its relations with Beijing, the new Uigur project format has potential of foreign policy and economic instability. This potential is to be revised according to the relations inside the SOC. The Uigur diaspora radical attacks in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia, taken under the control by the efforts of the SOC member-states, are capable to remind of themselves with new force and in a new way in a situation of synchronized unrest of the Tibetan and Uigur networks.

1. Serious and sustained movement toward disarmament by the present nuclear armed states is critical. This is not because their force of example would dissuade would-be proliferators - to assert that would be naïve in the extreme. Rather it is that without an assault on double standards, with an end to nuclear apartheid visibly in sight, it will be impossible to generate the consensus or majority decisions that will be necessary in international forums like the UN Security Council, the IAEA Board of Governors, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference or anywhere else that necessary for the line to be held against proliferation and in favor of nuclear security.
2. Recently restated Russian military doctrine makes no useful contribution to the goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in states’ national security strategies. Policy leadership will need as a result to come from the U.S., and all eyes in this respect are on the Nuclear Posture Review to be released in March. Hopefully in this context the significance will be appreciated of Japan moving in recent weeks to indicate, through statements of both Foreign Minister Okada and Prime Minister Hatoyama that they could, in effect, live with the US moving to the declaratory position that it regarded the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, so long as they exist, to be the deterrence of nuclear attacks against itself or its allies.
3 Mobilizing and sustaining the political will necessary to move us - fast - toward a nuclear weapon free world will, as always, be among the most difficult of all tasks. What is required is a combination of top-down leadership from the major nuclear players, preeminently Russia and the U.S., peer level commitment and pressure from like minded members of the wider international community (as seen in the past, for example, from the Seven Nations Initiative and New Agenda Coalition) and bottom-up pressure from civil society mobilized effectively enough to make governments feel accountable and responsive.

1. There were certain circles that took the of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as carte blanche for global domination, for unilateral decisions to use force throughout the world up to their own judgment, including preventive and preemptive strikes without any real threat of armed attack and without the UN Security Council’s consent. This course has been fixed in corresponding strategic concepts. In the last decades, the USA was consistently followed the policy of preserving and strengthening its global military superiority based on military presence, as constant factor of «resident power», in the key world regions, primarily, those of producing energy resources or transporting them, and also on advanced military-space technologies, including PRO deployment, on building up the most powerful Air and Naval Forces and Army in the world.
2. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is one of the major elements of the arms control system, that had been established (with the great hardships, it must be remarked) by the efforts of many in the world community towards the end of the Cold War, aimed to cover both strategic and conventional armaments. This system is ‘successfully’ being destroyed, today. It is destroyed not just due some objective reasons (though they are also a factor), but rather by purposeful policy of those forces that try to build up the global security system of their own, pursuing the interests of small enough group of the states.
3. To large extent, the current divergences in positions of the CFE participants resulted in Russia’s suggestion (true, it was too much delayed) to bring the CFE legal norms into accord with Europe’s actual state of political and military affairs. It was naive to think there would be no reciprocal reaction. As far as the CFE concerned, such a reaction took shape of Russia’s moratorium to observe its obligations under the initial treaty. However, this might well be avoided, if Russia’s Western partners had ratified the Agreement on the CFE Adaptation in due time. It has just to be surprised with the short-sightedness of those who thought it would be possible to put pressure upon the Russian side by procrastinating the process of ratification.

1. The EU member-states act in coordination in the international organizations and at the international conferences. The responsibility to coordinate is given to the EU High representative for foreign affairs and security policy. Those countries, that are also the UN Security Council members, act interactively and inform other EU member-states. If there is a EU’s decision on the issue in the UN Security Council, the member-states participating in its session initiate a petition for the High representative to be invited to expound the EU’s position (art. 34). The EU member-states diplomatic and consulate representatives’ cooperation aim at implementing the decisions in accordance with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) line (art. 35).
2. The European security and defense policy, given a new name of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), is a component of the CFSP. CSDP provides for the EU ability to carry out operative actions using both civil and military means. CSDP includes stage-by-stage working out the EU’s common defense policy aimed at the organizing the joint defense, once the European Council unanimously makes the decision to this effect. In such a case, the European Council recommends member- states to pass the decision in accordance with the constitutional norms of each of them. CFSP does not contradict the NATO’s common defense and security policy (paras1 and 2, art. 42).
3. The Lisbon treaty gives the European Union some new authorities in defense policy. The article 42 (para 7) provides, that in case of an armed aggression in the territory of a member-state other EU member-states “shell help it and assist with all means possible for them”. The stipulated duty to carry out the common defense “keeps to correspond to the obligations accepted within the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”. For these states, the NATO “remains the foundation of the collective defense and the instrument of its implementation” (para 7, art. 42).

The Russian society, as hot as ever, discuss the state and prospects of the education in our country. At that, by our traditions, some organizational measures as well as tendencies of the reforms are being discussed, rather than their outcomes and efficiency.
There is an opinion formed on actual diversification of the higher vocational training according to the concept of elite, mass and universal education to be developed in a modern society. By this concept, another higher school restructure, ambiguously appraised, next is being done. The question which concerns the educational community especially is, Will the several tens of federal and national research universities, chosen by the Ministry of Education and Science, be able to put the whole system of the Russian education onto qualitatively higher level? What the redistribution of funds and administrative support towards the ‘chosen’ would mean for the very existence of the ‘simpler’ universities, all the more so for the institutes.
And one of the most important questions of perspective development of vocational training, as well as of all our society, is, Will the just appeared rudiments of the high school competition remain in the built by the State new hierarchy, will there be uniform stimulus and conditions to enhance their competitiveness worked out?

1. After the bipolar system of the international relations collapsed, all states, including Poland, Germany and France, have been engaged in making up new ties. So, the Weimar Advisory Council was meant to appear due to the need of close mutually advantageous partnership for the sake of overcoming the crisis factors and, later on, assisting Poland’s integration into NATO and EU. There were weighty economic arguments in favor of prompt closer partnership as well. In 1999, Poland entered the North Atlantic Alliance. Later, in 2004, Poland became full and authorized member of the European family, having joined the European Union.
2. The Union has been tested by partnership – there was the need to reach compromise on common foreign policy, including on relations with Russia. There was also the need to solve inner problems (to work out the unitary European constitution), and for a long time it caused disagreements and discussions among the Weimar Three participating countries, for instance, the Nancy meeting in 2005. Besides, the common viewpoint on problems of energy security had to be achieved.
3. The Weimar partnership has become actual during the crisis. The crisis of financial system is a serious test for the Weimar triangle participating countries. But they not just successfully passed it, but also show high ability of teamwork in any conditions, even that difficult. In modern Europe, it is very important, for it proves their compliance with high standards of the all-European political and economic partnership. Last meeting was held in February 2010, with government representatives of the participating countries present. The meeting discussed the general economic strategy for Europe, continuations of climatic negotiations after the Copenhagen conference and energy security in Europe.