1. It is obvious that the world leaves crisis not soon. And how much we will appear ready to overcome arising difficulties – will show time. Anyway, already it is now clear that at existing economic model of managing to operate the country at the oil price in 140 dollars and in 60 dollars for barrel is, as they say, two big differences.
2. As analysts predict, by 2025 the world will represent multipolar international system, and China becomes the largest winner in it. China any other country “will render the next 20 years … a greater influence on the world”, than. Russia remains on the sixth place in the list of the largest economic regions of the world after the USA, China, Europe, India and Japan. It suits us?

1. To overcome the conceptual crisis of its foreign policy Russia should understand its national identity. Putting aside ridiculous attempts of our Liberals (who are, in fact, pseudo-Liberal successors of the Bolsheviks) to come into the world as some ‘white-and-fluffy’, sort of ‘new’ Russia that has been building up its statehood as if for just the last twenty years, Russia should unambiguously and undoubtedly define itself as the heiress to the historical - i.e. over-thousand-year-old - Russia. Clearly, if such is the case it has to undertake all its sins, including those made by the USSR. But then Russia is to remain the intelligible and recognizable subject of the world history.
2. Enhancing the foreign policy efficiency requires to pass a special law on the mechanism of development, adoption and implementation of foreign policy decisions that would provide for precise coordinating the activities of the ministries and bodies in this sphere under direct control by the RF President to ensure the Russian Federation’s single policy line in relations with other states and international organizations. Such a mechanism is to be of collective nature, involving all the foreign policy actors, and lean on analysis and expertise of the governmental and nongovernmental research centers that should be set up and funded generously.
3. As to Russia’s image abroad, it, certainly, needs to be improved. But, at that, this has to be kept in mind: whatever efforts were undertaken, whatever funding for the purpose were allocated, all those PR-energies would be wasted, if there were no improvements inside the country. One simple thing has to be understood: to have good image abroad the country has to really be an attractive, not to appear to be such. Hence, the field of correcting the image is not outside our country, but at home. As a wise proverb says, The wolf may change his coat, but not his disposition.

1. Advantage of the message of Medvedev, by the way, as well as Vladimir Putin's all public statements in this respect, consists that he sees a difference between normal human respect for the country, its achievements, traditions and a myth about a special Russian way, about a special Russian alternative civilizations. Here the understanding of is important that normal, humanistic patriotism should not conduct to the isolationism sermon, opposition of Russia to Europe, and the Russian base values – European.
2. The similar accent on values of a free and worthy life, undoubtedly, is proved not only from the ideological point of view, as the important demonstration of adherence of the country leaders to the European culture and the European values, but also from the practical point of view. Not casually on the foreground the major practical problem of fastening and arrangement of the most presented representatives of new Russia in the country is put forward. Certainly, new generation realises, about what, by the way, Medvedev too said that the main condition of development and democracy preservation nevertheless is our national sovereignty, but it, young generation, simultaneously wants, that the Russian life, eventually, became more worthy, reasonable and was released from set of traditional Russian absurdities.

1. Acknowledgement of the role by Russia on a world scene, along with impressive economic growth of such two Euroasian giants as China and India, apparently, have definitively fixed the end of the unipolar world based on individual leadership of the United States in the international relations, and have served creation of the minimum and sufficient conditions for formation of a new, multipolar planetary order. There comes a new cycle of the geopolitical development which realities become, in all visibility, not the nations or regional powers, and large continental spaces.
2. Threat of possibility of merge of the general geopolitical interests of the largest Euroasian powers (Russia, China and India) and aspirations of some South American states have caused again alarm of US State department and the certain North Atlantic analytical centres which are engaged in revealing of crisis zones and working out of the geopolitical strategy answering to global priorities of Washington and the Pentagon. Their attention is chained to continental regions of Eurasia and the countries of the Latin America tormented with old, internal contradictions not solved to this day.

1. The US presidential election campaign has, in fact, avoided the thorny problems in the American-Russian relations. To a great extent, it was caused by advancing to the foreground far more burning problem of survival in the clutches of unexpectedly blazed global economic crisis. Even emotional cries concerning the Caucasian war, feigned by somewhat one-sided media coverage, have little resounded in the course of political debate between the contenders.
2. The history of the NATO expanding deserves closer studying in Russia, which ruling elite were completely absorbed, in that historical moment, with the search of some mystical ‘Party money’, and mass ‘Monopoly game’ to give out vouchers to millions of citizens to ostensibly testify the democratic character of the privatization followed. In the USA, meanwhile, a serious attempt was made to run national discussion aimed at stopping the hasty transformation of the NATO.
3. In any case, whoever is to move into the White House, it is of tremendous importance what political luggage the Russian leadership would bring in to reassess the lessons of the period after Cold War and to establish relations with new US Administration in the dramatic moment of the unprecedented global economic crisis. Both in the foreign and home policies (as far as the latter concerns, no Soros and Warren Buffet money combined, alas, could help to wage struggle against the corruption).

1. With the start of borders rehashing in Europe and, consequently, with abandonment of the principle of indestructibility of national borders and territorial integrity, the Helsinki Agreement signatories have also alienated themselves of some other major principles, such as of non-interference into each others internal affairs, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-use of force. The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia that resulted in its actual dismembering is a vivid example. The NATO Western member-countries had been actively participating in the process, to which their recognition of Kosovo independence put a logic end.
2. It is of general knowledge, the relations between Russia and the Baltic states are of the antagonistic kind. Poland, Germany, the Scandinavian countries view further development of the region differently. Still, the contradictions are not antagonistic enough to block the way to consent. The break-through could and should take place, when Russia undertook the role of communicator in this process, the communicator that sees its mission not just to act as a mediator who is good in understanding and considering the interests of the parties, but also to proactively look for new ideas, to minimize emergent threats, to be sort of the ‘foreman of opinions’ who continually creates various new opportunities for dialogue.
3. Russia’s communicative functions of are now demanded all the way along the the Russian borders, from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean – in the Caucasus, the Central Asia, the Far East. Searching compromise and achieving agreements at the regional level might well, likely to the puzzle pieces being laid together, lead to forming a new security system at the global level, the very security system that is en par with the contemporary realities and takes the maximum account of the interests of the overwhelming majority of the world states.

1. India’s foreign policy strategic goal – to be transformed into the world power - was set up over half a century ago, immediately after the country had gained its independence. The crash of the bipolar world, collapse of the Soviet Union, and virtual break-up of Nonalignment movement made India to loose the chance to play upon intermediate position between the West and the East and use contradictions between the two systems, that gave it substantial advantage in the past. In a certain way, India’s foreign policy strategy has been re-orientated, but that, primarily, meant mechanisms and ways of achieving macro-goals, not the strategic tasks themselves.
2. To the system of the international relations in the Southern Asia, the India-Pakistan relations are of principal importance, both because of the two countries’ greatest political, economic and military weight, and their virtually continuous confrontation. The differences in national interests, political systems and political cultures, the religious heterogeneity are supplemented with the geo-strategic factor. Pakistan is adjacent to the Muslim region, whence it might receive additional economic and military resources to strengthen its positions against India. From the very outset, Pakistani governments saw India as the major strategic adversary. Even after the 1971 War, Pakistan remains the only India’s potential opponent in Southern Asia.
3. To overcome mistrust between the states and peoples in the region, to strengthen the regional security the important role might be played by the Southern Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Officially, it was set up in December 1985 in Dacca. It was agreed, the SAARK should deal with exclusively problems of economic, technical and cultural cooperation. There were also agreement to prohibit all official discussions of bilateral or disputed issues at joint forums, and to consider any decisions passed only if they got the votes of all the parties present. The SAARK most weighty contribution to normalization of the situation in the region has become forming up the mechanism of informal meetings and discussions between the national leaders.

1. A possibility of Iran turning up as a nuclear power brings about some sort of international crisis. If the worst scenario were to develop, it could provoke some large-scale conflict. At that, one of the major actors, alongside with Iran itself, is the United States. This article aimed at analyzing the Iran-US relations, including the following aspects: the American Administration’s interests in the context of preventing Iran’s nuclear armament; the Iranian leadership’s hypothetical goals and problems; chances to diplomatically settle the conflict; the optional conflict escalating right up to use of force.
2. In fact, the relation between the USA and Iran were adversary as early as after the victory of ‘the Islamic Revolution’ and ‘the hostages affair’. Though after the war with Iraq that bled Iran white and Teheran’s Islamic expansion obviously having faded, American Administration calmed down, but it went on to see the very existence of militant, radical, anti-Western regime in Iran as a potential threat to the order the United States considered mostly favorable to their interests in the Middle East region. When, late in 1990s, the protest moods overran the Iranian society and Khatami was elected President, the US saw that as favorable indications that the of the clerical dictatorship started withering away.
3. There are three scenarios for the events to develop: either the USA, jointly with Europe and, if there was luck, with other members of the world community, would exert all the efforts to force Iran, by means of diplomatic pressure, to abandon uranium enrichment works and stop the attempts to acquire the nuclear weapon; or, if that failed, would try to organize isolation, blockade of Iran in order to punish it with economic sanctions and still force it to concede; or they would recognize the failure of all attempts to bring pressure upon Iran and reconcile to the thought it had become another nuclear power.

1. The disproportional great influence the military exert on the ruling power caused as well by the weakness of the Mid-Eastern politicians themselves that has been much determined by the special status of the military rooted in the national consciousness and historical memory of the people. The political class looked at many things in the country by the eyes of the military, fearful to challenge the army. The political space on which the civil authorities could have operated by political means, remained rather limited, so the politicians’ activities (with care of the military) often proved inefficient, caused popular mistrust and low national support. And, on the contrary, against such a background the trust to the military stood high in the society.
2. In the overwhelming majority of the Arab countries, the civil society is just beginning to develop. There still exist many contradictions between the civil society and the military. The former stands for reforming the army that keeps all the attributes of the authoritative system armed forces, while the governments try to keep the status-quo, being fearful of breaking the balance of forces and interests. Even in such secular and democratic country as Turkey, the ruling elite, especially its military wing, negatively react to such suggestions, as yet. The military are eager to preserve their special status in the society in every possible way, referring to some outside threat, danger of the radical Islamism and ethnic separatism.
3. If the Arab countries in the Middle East choose a democratic way of development, the civil society would begin to gradually play the decisive role in forming the governmental power and policy, in controlling the principal spheres of the state’s life and activities, including the army. Today, however, due to backwardness of democratic institutes in the Mid-Eastern Arab states and, in fact, complete lack of true civil society in them, one may speak not so much of the civil control over the army, but rather of the control on the part of political power that includes, alongside with civil politicians, the representatives of the military as well.

1. No matter what the political crisis that seized Turkey in the past few years result in, its consequences will be meaningful far beyond the particularly national limits. The thing is, we are witnessing the deep process that has become of big international scale and might be termed as the Islam modernization, the country’s Europeanization, that is its joining to the European way of thinking and living, forming up sort of Islamic and Democratic synthesis.
2. The Turkish society is split. The joint forces of the Left-centers and Nationalists headed by the generals and supported by the liberal intellectuals assault the power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is called pro-Islamic or moderately Islamic in the West and in Russia. The AKP’s political opponents are sincere in their belief, that the policy of this ruling party is dangerous to the system of laicism, to the principles of secular government which Turkey follows since the times of Kemal Atatьrk (early 1920s), the founder of the modern Turkish state.
3. The Neo-Islamists proved to be capable to work out and implement the effective model of socio-economic development. The interethnic reconciliation project, now under operation, should be also acknowledged effective. The Justice and Development Party’s positioning as the political organization of the movement for Islamic democracy would give it no chance to be removed from the political arena, whatever is the outcome of the confrontation of the traditional political forces there. Similarly, it is impossible to picture the political life and future trends of social development in Turkey without participation of new forces guided by the Neo-Islamism.
4. The Turkish political establishment – the Kemalists, the Right and Left winger, the Nationalists - are not willing to perceive the Neo-Islamism as the objective phenomenon. But it is another thing that is much more important, namely – now, in their activities, they all cannot help reckoning with the Islamic factor. The future of this international political phenomenon is directly dependent on the ability of the world community to show tolerance, to apprehend the Islamic democracy not just as the theoretical doctrine but also as the new political trend, with which the common partnerships in the interstate relations may and need be developed.