1.The theatre-politics connection has been determined by both cultural and genetic factors, and contemporary modernizing influences upon the society. Since the ancient times, theatricality in politics is caused by its repetition of actions within existing common and political culture - rituals, ceremonies and etiquette activities, and politicians' need to play traditionally developed roles dependent on socio-political conditions.
2.Political actions, with their great audience and simultaneous TV broadcast, share traits with some theatrical shows. These theatrical activities are highly effective because of their complex means of information influencing - the sound text, music, light and plastic of movements, and those who participate are being dragged into show by the logic of organized action, not always by their own will, coming under its influence.
3.An excessive 'theatrelizing of political consciousness' seriously affects both a person and the society. The approach based on the theatrecratic paradigm results in dividing the society into an auditorium and a stage, the stage being separated from the auditorium with footlights. Those in the theatre, in their turn, are demarcated into spectators watching a political show - 'the public' - and actors playing this or that roles.

1. For the past three months there were many events which have rendered essential influence on current political processes, their dynamics and an orientation. It is at times difficult to get rid of sensation, that on the ground all becomes closer and uncomfortable, more and more persevering attempts of stronger seem to impose build ideas and a way of life less strong. And absolutely intolerably when start to dig entrenchments at your gate.
2. For an audience, tempted in political speeches, V. Putin's Munich speech about problems of the international safety, certainly, has seemed unusually frank and sharp. Still, things are named by the names and there were, that the wolves who ostensibly have replaced the diet on a grass, still hunt for sheeps, and mainly on another's pastures.
3. As if to an opportunity of the big war, it is hardly possible to speak about it now seriously, as, indeed, there is no difference between verbal duel and the valid politics in a reality.
4. Undoubtedly, revision of much of is required that else yesterday it seemed possible and comprehensible. The world, really, varies, changes also huge space of the former USSR, so, and a field of world politics of Russia which as consider, begins at its borders.

1.For quite a long time, the basic structure of the Russian politics lokked like the one or 'one and a half' party system, where the political life had to be focused within the only 'government party'. The change in the content of the very term of 'government party' has become the principal innovation. Elsewhere, that means the party in power, or the governing party; but in Russia the 'government party' is the one that belongs to the government.
2.The formation of the one-and-a-half-party system has experimentally proved the copy-book truth that impunity gives birth to corruption. The nomenclature has realized, that by joining the proper party and mounting the proper portrait on the wall anyone who is something in the system if free to treat the folks subordinate in any way he or she wishes, while any critic of his/hers would be labeled 'extremist', at the best. As a result, the totality of corruption seems to become a headache not just for the state, but also for the biggest, and therefore the most powerful corrupted ones.
3.In contemporary Russia, there are two parties to follow the interests of the groupings within the social stratum of influence, i.e. the ruling bureaucracy. The Unified Russia, a right-wing party by its policy,  reflects the position of 'liberal fundamentalists', while the 'social revolutionaries', urged to be left-wing and patriotic, are the alter ego to the oligarchy of force. Stimulating competition between the loyal bureaucratic parties the government demands much of them to  conform to fundamentally new, public and competitive, nature of their existence.

1.Supported by President Putin, Sergey Mironov's, the Chairman of the Council of Federation, initiative to convoke the whole left-wing center under his command, to absorb into his Party of Life both the remains of the Motherland Party and the gaining strength Pensioners' Party had resulted not just in confusion within the government party ranks, but also in the disarray of loosing guide-posts which had been laboriously remounted along our still chaotic political space.
2.In current moral and psychological situation in Russia, the emergence of the second, left-wing at this time, government party can in no way help to strengthen the multi-party system. No doubt, the polemics, two-way verbal pricking between the ardent Putin's supporter Gryzlov and the ardent Putin's supporter Mironov are bringing some longed-for intrigue into our boring political life. But it helps in no way - in absolutely no way - to overcome the window-dressing nature of our democracy.
3.That is the present political scenery: the people guided by the mentality and psychology of favoritism, the two government parties, the scene where you cannot tell a true Putin's supporter from an untrue one, and where - the most important thing - you cannot clearly see what Putin wants himself, who he is going to make his successor, what party he is going to make the principal one.

1.Last months, Putin repeatedly claimed that he was unwilling to ballot for the third presidency. Lately, nevertheless, there were unceasing attempts to prompt Putin to nominate himself for the next elections, and to initiate respective constitutional novices. In October 2004, that option had been chosen by the president Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus and brought him to success.
2.The role of the key protagonist to re-elect Putin for the third term is being played by the assistant-head of the President's Administration, Igor Setchin. To keep the highest government post to himself gives Putin and his team a chance to regain their positions, which have already made them the bureaucratic oligarchs governing the strategic branches of the economy.
3.If there is a stalemate in the relations between the 'centrists' and 'men of force' with no compromise foreseeable, Putin, probably, will put forward a third candidate, who communicates with both groups that would see him guarding their interests. Each of the two groupings would try to win this compromise figure over.

1.For the Unified Russia Party, the federal elections will not be as easily-won as that seemed at the first glance. Risk factors will be of essence, as they say inside the Unified Russia, the Kondopoga events has cut the party's votes in Karelia by 7 to 10 percent. Much will depend upon the level of social tension, because the sweeps between the two subcultures are unpredictable. Above all, the party will have to supplement its federal program with the regional ones.
2.Experts believe, the past elections proved the viability of the 'second government party' project. As the elections revealed, the alliance of the Russian Party of Life, Russian Pensioners' Party and Motherland Party has in fact became the second government party. As to the Equitable Russia's perspectives, one should made a note of the RPP's increasing 'political weight', that might affect an alignment of forces among the project participants. The 'social' rhetoric is topical and called for thus making the project's perspectives look favorable.
3.The past elections, that are to be seen as the model for the State Duma elections of December 2007, proved the governing elite's wish to rely on the solid  pro-presidential majority in the parliament-to-come, with no party controlling the constitutional majority, for the new head of state to be elected right after the parliamentary elections would need diverse pro-presidential majority to keep the space for maneuver.

1. The cycle of the Russian vector of the foreign policy followed by Paris, put into motion in 1998 with the advent of the Ekaterinburg Triangle, is coming to its completion. The 'triangle' ought to fix Russia's special position in the European continent under the conditions of uncertain reliability of changes it was being underwent. The French-German tandem aspired also to gain enough weight to stabilize the 'Greater Europe'.
2. Moscow gives meaning to the context of the multi-polar world concept maintained in Paris, the concept in which it is difficult to draw some distinction between multi-polarity and many-sidedness. So, Russia considers itself to be an independent power pole, and sees many-sidedness just as the means to support its influence, rather than as the method to solve international problems.
3. The significant part of the French elite indeed think Vladimir Putin being the last 'statesman' on the international scene. At that, the significant part of the media and intellectuals treat him with deep animosity and do not hesitate to perceive him as some analogue of Stalin's. He has come out of the state security structure, that is why he is indelibly marked with the 'original sin' of his serving the KGB.

1.The insurgency in Iraq following the clean classic victory for the US and UK forces prompted a re-think on US doctrine. The tendency is away from the tactical-technical-organisational line in Trinquier, Galula, and 1980s US doctrine on Low Intensity Conflict. The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-07.22 (interim) of 1 October 2004 is already quite close to the new draft document. The 2006 draft of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which has become operational on 1 October 2006, by contrast, devotes little more than 10 per cent to such technicalities.
2.Strategies in the Cold War, especially nuclear strategies, are functions of the ideologies, national cultures and beliefs of those who formulated them, and in no way sought to understand the adversary’s military thinking in order to tailor one’s own posture and capabilities to his psychological weaknesses.  This was criticised by a few, but brushed aside as hardly relevant by the “victors” of the Cold War. The Yugoslav Wars of Secession gave new prominence to the opinion of experts in human personality and culture which social scientists had never ceased to ponder. 
3.What is needed is the recruitment of more civilian regional experts and specialised social/cultural anthropologists as advisers of officers in all leading positions of a counterinsurgency, provided the latter show as much openness to their advice as Generals Petraeus and Mattis have shown to Dr McFate.

1.The 2005-06 general elections in Iraq and the forming-up of the national government that followed gave the George Bush administration some ground to optimistically assess the outcome of their military and political campaign in that country then. But, since the Spring 2006, the situation in Iraq became to deteriorate badly: there were daily acts of violence by Iraqi and foreign terrorists against the local population; intensified clashes between the Shiite militias and Sunni Arab insurgency; sharp increase in the number of US military casualties, all these made Iraq plunged into abyss of chaos.
2.The Bush plan may become some sort of a trap for the Democrats, considering the majority of the Democratic party leadership had favored the invasion in Iraq some time in the past, while now they actually call for capitulation, by recklessly and hastily moving the troops out. The issue might split the Democratic camp into 'toughs' and 'defeatists', it was quite recently when Hilary Clinton and John Kerri abstained from calling for immediate US military withdrawal from Iraq, trying to gain some points on the eve of elections.
3.By proclaiming the new deal policy to settle the situation in Iraq, Bush tried to convince the Americans that the problem is the national one, rather than a miscalculation made by the Republicans and neo-conservatives. Among all other things, his plan, be it successful in the smallest degree, would give more chance for the Republican nominee for the 2008 presidency. The current US President, though, by making his plan public, which is contrary to the Democratic majority statements and is at variance with the strengthening rejection of the war within the American society, is undoubtedly going risky, for the possibility of a collapse is very high.

1.Many an Islamic radical still sees the revolutionary activities abroad, export of the Islamic revolution as the basis of their country's self-identification and the source of legitimacy for their governance. Such a vision prompts Iran to support the Hezbolla movement in the Southern Lebanon and to block the Middle East peace settlement. That sort of activities makes the United States to blame Iran of supporting the international terrorism and, consequently, to define its status of "derelict" in the American political lexicon.
2.The United States pursues the pressure policy towards Iran in coordination with the European Union, and asks Russia to stop cooperation with Iran in developing nuclear technologies. Washington still suspects Iran of developing nuclear weapons, on the premises that to possess such weapons would have served the Iranian security interests. The United States agues, that it would have been  economically expedient and diminished the danger of collision with the nuclear armed Israel.
3.The current US administration is unlikely to change its super-tough line on Iran. Yet it is clear, that the United States will have to make a choice: either to develop the crisis of the Iraqi sort, or to normalize the relations with Iran, that has become rather complicated affair after the government change in Iran and changes in the neighboring countries (occupation of Iraq, instability in Afghanistan, the Russian Federation's active position in the region, etc.).