1. The basics in the Hezbollah strategy to fight against Israel's modern, hi-tech army were to create a supply network to delivery arms, and - it cannot be excluded - to build some enterprises to manufacture elementary anti-tank weaponry in the territory of Lebanon. The strategy and tactics were based upon not just lessons of Mid-East wars, but upon operations in the war against the enemy that had been superior as far as technologies concerned. The tactics were based on operations by small units and special teams in close contact with the enemy (down to hand-to-hand fighting) in the areas similar to fortified ones, and on tactics of conducting combat operations in underground facilities, and on beforehand preparation of the district for guerrilla activities.
2. The Israeli-Lebanese summer 2006 war proved to become the second war in the 21st century, which fact had been demonstrated by not just the Israeli air forces' abundant use of rockets and bombs of high-accuracy aiming to hit the objectives in Lebanon, but also by the use of weapons based on new physical principles, with relatively low casualties among the civilians, at that. For the second time in the 21st century, Israel, despite its partial unreadiness for the war, waged the full-scale information war during the combat phase.
3. Destructing the Lebanese state's infrastructure not just had no effect on arms delivery to the Hezbollah and in no way weakened it, but, on the contrary, Israel had lost the information war even more. The Hezbollah militants have no fear of losses, for the death of one would multiple their ranks several times over: "Having chopped off one head, two would grow in its stead." Israel's decision to leave the International Organization of Journalists (felt hurt with the unpleasant media criticism) in no way changed the situation in the information war.
4. On the contrary, official information proved not to become reliable among the Israeli population. Explanatory campaign, having begun with quite a clear structure, slipped. Consequently, mass-media usurped  the right to explain, while the IDF began to play in their tune, that caused perplexity sometime. To add, there were problems within the IDF themselves, which affected them very badly - the vicious  axis of 'the attack in Kafr Kan' - 'the rockets hit a group of soldiers in Kfar Gilady' - 'general stuff deputy chief's appointing the commander of Northern military district' - 'dispute over the military operation in last 36 hours'.