1.Last months, Putin repeatedly claimed that he was unwilling to ballot for the third presidency. Lately, nevertheless, there were unceasing attempts to prompt Putin to nominate himself for the next elections, and to initiate respective constitutional novices. In October 2004, that option had been chosen by the president Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus and brought him to success.
2.The role of the key protagonist to re-elect Putin for the third term is being played by the assistant-head of the President's Administration, Igor Setchin. To keep the highest government post to himself gives Putin and his team a chance to regain their positions, which have already made them the bureaucratic oligarchs governing the strategic branches of the economy.
3.If there is a stalemate in the relations between the 'centrists' and 'men of force' with no compromise foreseeable, Putin, probably, will put forward a third candidate, who communicates with both groups that would see him guarding their interests. Each of the two groupings would try to win this compromise figure over.
4.No matter, what kind of compromise is found to solve the problem of the successor, the new president would have the limited space for maneuver, and thus he would have to consider interests of both groupings. That is why, probably, one has to assume that the 'liberally-conservative' policy of synthesizing the views of 'men of force' and 'liberals/centrists' would be continued in the form of combination of the strong, authoritative if necessary, state and the liberal economy with preservation of the state sector in the key industries.